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DISCOVERY
Introduction
PROF. KATSORIS: We now have our third panel discussion,
discovery.
At one point in the history of securities arbitration, there was very
little discovery. There was clearly the potential for trial by ambush;
thus, as SICA was formed, it addressed the issue to some extent. But
it was only after Shearson/AmericanExpress Inc v. McMahon,8 when
arbitration basically became mandatory, that the issue took on added
significance.
We're now beginning, depending on who you listen to, to see in
arbitration many of the problem areas of discovery that are prevalent
in courtroom litigation. The issue won't go away because you can't go
back to the "no discovery" practices that prevailed many, many years
ago.
To discuss these issues, we have two distinguished panelists, and
we'll start with Mike Stone.
Panelists
MR. STONE: To show you how well this Symposium is working,
Gus, I am ceding my time to Dave Robbins who has asked to go first,
and I think it's already having the effect that claimant's counsel and
respondent's counsel can get along, even as to who goes first.
MR. ROBBINS: Ten years ago, when I was Director of Arbitration
at the American Stock Exchange, and hearings rarely took more than
a day, the discovery rules of the SROs mirrored those more innocent
days. They simply said this: Prior to the first hearing session, the parties shall cooperate in the voluntary exchange of such documents and
information as will serve to expedite the arbitration.
That was it. And, believe it or not, it worked because arbitration at
that time, before the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in McMahon,
rarely involved big bucks and, even more importantly, because customer attorneys didn't know much about securities industries
documents.
Once all disputes were forced into arbitration by the Supreme
Court, the SEC and customers' attorneys saw that without proper procedural safeguards, the arbitration process could become arbitration
by ambush. While arbitrators had subpoena power before McMahon,
documents that were ordered to be produced were usually produced
at the first hearing, leaving no time for analysis. No discovery rules
were in place to allow parties to prepare properly for the hearings.
85. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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Customer-broker cases are often won or lost by documents that
support or contradict a party. Some truly can be smoking guns and
they can point either way. Because most orders are given and confirmed over the phone, the industry produces a great deal of documents to memorialize the transactions, to instruct brokers about
accepted industry rules and procedures, and to monitor broker
activity.
The need to obtain those documents in advance of substantive hearings was first urged by the SEC in September 1987, a few months after
McMahon and a month before the stock market crash. That month,
Richard Ketchum, Director of Market Regulation, wrote to James
Buck, Secretary of the Exchange, and made several major recommendations to improve the process. In time, almost all those recommendations were adopted by SICA and, in turn, by the SROs.
One of the most important recommendations was this one: SICA
should include within the Uniform Code rules to ensure fair and
timely document production between the parties before the arbitration hearing and to allow for pre-hearing conferences and preliminary
hearings for large or complex cases.
In response to the SEC's call for change, the Exchange and the
other SROs enacted a well-intentioned discovery rule in mid-1989. 6
I say well-intentioned because its bark is much louder than its bite.
It's still based on the rather naive premise that arbitration is a business person's forum for gentlemen and ladies where honesty and
frankness are its cornerstone and where cooperation is its watchword.
Well, the discovery rules are not working effectively in today's
world of securities arbitration. Before I go into the specific failings of
the current discovery rules and propose the means to correct those
failings, let me tell you what the rules provide.
Since 1989, the discovery rules have provided,
Number one: A procedure to seek, respond to and object to document requests and information requests. It can start as early as a
month after the claim is served or when the answer is filed, whichever
is earlier;
Number two: A pre-hearing exchange rule so that each side gets a
ten day advance warning of what the opponent hopes to introduce on
their direct case;
Number three: Pre-hearing conferences to resolve discovery
problems;
Number four: Arbitrator subpoena power, enabling a party to demand production prior to the first hearings; and
86. See NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 619,
14, § 20, at 16-18.

2619; Uniform Code, supra note
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Number five: The power of arbitrators nationwide, and conceivably
worldwide, to direct the appearance of individuals in the securities
industry.
At this year's Practicing Law Institute program on securities arbitration, Bob Clemente and Deborah Masucci lamented the fact that,
in an almost knee-jerk reaction, parties request pre-hearing conferences instead of cooperating in the exchange of documents. This has
the effect of prolonging the process because arbitrators aren't usually
selected until shortly before the hearing.
What are the practical problems with the Exchange's discovery
rules, and how can they be corrected? To answer these questions, I
discussed them with a number of my colleagues at the Public Investors
Arbitration Bar Association ("PIABA"). I also spoke with fellow arbitrators and with my friends on the defense side.
The problems are not insurmountable. They can be solved by two
things-education and enforcement-the education of practitioners
and arbitrators, and the enforcement of the discovery rules by arbitrators against parties who are violating Rule 619 with impunity.
Rule 619(a) provides that any request for documents or other information shall be specific, relate to the matter in controversy, and afford
the party to whom the request is made a reasonable period of time to
respond without interfering with the time set for the hearing.' It is
well intentioned, but it's not working.
Education and enforcement-with those two goals in mind, here
are the six main problems with the discovery rules:
Number one: They don't list the documents that should be provided
in the common customer-broker cases. Even though The Arbitrator's
Manual has a suggested list,' it's only that, a suggestion. Most arbitrators who conduct pre-hearing conferences don't have a copy of the
Manual, or, if they do, they haven't read it. It's almost treated like a
limited partnership prospectus.
Without an automatic, approved list of documents, this allows an
attorney, who may be more experienced than the arbitrator, to convince the arbitrator that such documents are not necessary, are privileged, are too burdensome to accumulate and produce, or are
irrelevant to the issues of the case;
Number two: The current rules permit the very evil that they sought
to overcome: word-processor generated, cookie-cutter, multi-paragraph document requests. The less experienced practitioner actually
spends the time, and his client's money, to respond to these neverending document requests;
87. NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 619(a), l 2619.
88. Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, The Arbitrator's Manual 11-12

(1992).
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Number three: By not defining the term "information request," the
rules permit a party to submit laundry lists of interrogatories that
are time-consuming, burdensome, and contrary to the purpose of
arbitration;
Number four The rules provide no guidance on how the pre-hearing conference will be conducted or the standards that will be applied
by the person presiding over that conference. As a result, there is a
great inconsistency in rulings, depending on the arbitrator presiding at
the conference.
For example, one arbitrator may believe a brokerage firm should
produce all of the other customer complaints involving that broker or
that product, since a number of complaints may not only show a pattern of misconduct, but also may indicate poor supervision, since a
manager who was aware of customer complaints should have imposed
greater oversight over that broker.
On the other hand, another arbitrator, faced with the same request
for other customer complaints, may feel that since the purpose of the
present arbitration is to decide that case, it is not appropriate to hear
disputed evidence from another case. That arbitrator will deny the
request. There needs to be consistency;
Number five: Pre-hearing conferences, at best, only resolve discovery issues. They don't tackle the other issues that contribute to the
increased time it takes to finish a case. They don't set all the hearing
dates in advance. There are no stipulations of facts or stipulations of
documents. There is no identification and briefing of contested issues
before the hearing, and there is no discussion on the possible mediation of the case. The sole aim of pre-hearing conferences is to try to
resolve discovery disputes. And it doesn't always do that;
Number six: The Exchange discovery rules don't have real, effective sanctions for non-compliance.8 9 Threats of sanctions are mere
window dressing and nothing more. This is pretty serious stuff, and let
me emphasize, these are not just the complaints of customer attorneys. They are echoed by in-house and outside defense counsel, by
arbitrators, and by tribunal administrators with whom I have spoken.
What can be done to deal with these major flaws in the system?
What can be done to educate practitioners so that they get the most
out of the process and to enforce the rules when parties choose to
disregard arbitrator orders or to stymie the process? I recommend
that the following six steps be taken as soon as possible, and that they
go into effect just as fast:
Number one: Documents. The Exchange and other member organizations of SICA must have a list of categories of documents to be
produced automatically by each party within a specified number of
89. See NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 621,
supra note 88, at 14-17.

2621; The Arbitrator's Manual,
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days after the answer is filed. This list should be sent out by the arbitration department. Failure to produce the documents should result in
sanctions, which I will discuss in a minute.
This document list should be keyed to the types of claims alleged in
the statement of claim and in any counterclaim. The list in The Arbitrator's Manual is a start, but it doesn't go far enough. The PIABA
has formed a discovery committee to propose such a list. The Securities Industry Association should do the same.
Each side's list should be submitted to SICA at its next meeting in
January, and SICA should adopt a document list at that time or by its
next meeting.
What should be on the automatic approved list?
For the customer, at a minimum:
a. Missing monthly statements, confirmations, and opening account
forms;
b. Missing correspondence, prospectuses, and marketing material;
c. All records of the broker concerning that customer's account, such
as holding pages, notes of conversations, correspondence with regulators, analyses of trading activity, and internal, non-privileged
memos by or to the branch manager,
d. Relevant records of the firm concerning the customer's account,
such as activity reports, commission runs, correspondence with
regulators, order tickets for certain cases, manager's supervisory
logs, portions of the compliance manual, and research reports
concerning the securities in question; and,
e. Regulatory records should also be on the list. That is, records
concerning the broker: his U-4 or U-5, and all amendments and
attachments to them, as well as internal reviews, if those reviews
refer to the account in question or to similar activities of the
broker.
For the brokers and the firm, the following, at a minimum:
a. The customer's copy of everything that he or she received from
the firm and from the entities that the customer invested in; that
is, monthly statements, opening account forms, confirms, prospectuses, quarterly and annual reports, and correspondence. Anything that the customer could have written on that he or she
received from the brokerage firm;
b. Income tax returns for cases involving allegations of unsuitability
or unauthorized trading, with special emphasis on pages one and
two of Form 1040 and Schedules D and E;
c. Records from other brokerage firms where the customer had an
account; and,
d. The customer's own analysis of trading in his account.
Number two: Word-Processor Document Requests. If the
mandatory production list goes into effect, this should cut down on
lengthy, additional requests. Such additional requests, however,

1556

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

should be required to specify what issue or issues in the case the documents will support or contradict, and there should be a limitation on
the number of additional requests, with no subparagraphs or
subheadings;
Number three: Information Request Interrogatories. Requests for
information should be permitted only if documents are not available
and if the information requested relates to what would be in documents. Some examples are education and work background and
licenses held and revoked. Testimonial requests, such as what did the
broker say to the customer or what did the customer say to the broker, his wife, and his friends, should be prohibited;
Number four Standards to Apply in Pre-Hearing Conferences.
The Exchange's arbitration staff should spend quality time with the
arbitrator who will preside over the pre-hearing conference before the
conference.
Staff attorneys have to be more than glorified caterers or postal
workers. They are the greatest untapped source of knowledge and
guidance in arbitration today. Staff attorneys should make sure that
before a pre-hearing conference is held, the arbitrator has carefully
read the pleadings, drafted a chart of his own on outstanding document requests, and articulated to the attorney a standard to determine
whether documents or information will be ordered to be produced or
not. And that standard should be this: Is the request directly related
to an issue in controversy?
Number five: Accomplishing More at Pre-Hearing Conferences.
First of all, the surest way to expedite the arbitration process, resolve
discovery disputes earlier, and start substantive hearings earlier is to
select at least one of the arbitrators as soon as the answer is filed.
That arbitrator must have a strong working knowledge of the arbitration rules and must clearly understand that a party can't develop his
case if the other side drags its feet or refuses to cooperate with discovery rules.
Before the pre-hearing conference takes place, each side should be
sent a checklist of issues to be discussed and agreed upon at the prehearing conference: document requests, stipulations of facts, stipulations on the admission of documents into evidence, and hearing dates;
Number Six: Putting the Bite Into the Bark. The Arbitrator's Manual suggests certain sanctions for non-compliance with discovery orders.'
It's the rare arbitration panel that will even entertain
arguments on sanctions, let alone enforce them.
What are the current suggested sanctions, and what should they be
in order to really enforce the rules?
90. See The Arbitrators's Manual, supra note 88, at 15-16.
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Current sanction one: Arbitrators can draw an adverse inference
against the party that didn't comply with the order of production. Big
deal.
Currentsanction two: Arbitrators can assess adjournment fees, forum fees, and other costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees. For
big firms, this doesn't mean much. For smaller firms, they simply
won't pay it, and the case will proceed anyway. Few arbitrators, in
any event, have the confidence in their powers to award monetary
sanctions.
Currentsanction three: Arbitrators may initiate a disciplinary referral. By then it's too late. The arbitration is over.
Currentsanctionfour. Arbitrators may strike all or part of a claim
or answer. They never have, and they never will, as long as these suggestions remain suggestions.
What's the answer? What's the most effective sanction? The last
one: To strike all or part of a claim or answer and to prohibit absolutely a party from introducing evidence in that regard at the hearing.
However, if documents in question don't relate to that party's direct
case, and thus the preclusion sanction would not accomplish anything-where, for example, the firm doesn't want to turn over damaging internal marketing material, or where a customer refuses to
disclose his tax returns-then the more appropriate sanction is monetary. But it has to be imposed at the time of the violation and not be a
reserved decision until the end of the case. It should be paid directly
to the other side and not to the SRO.
While courts have vacated awards on the ground that arbitrators
refused to hear relevant evidence, courts also defer, in most instances,
to the way arbitrators conduct their proceedings. If there are rules in
place, and if those rules give both sides a full and fair opportunity to
be heard, no court is going to overturn an award, especially if a party
violated one of the rules and was sanctioned for it.
Our PIABA committee on discovery is considering the combination
of automatic fines for a party's failure to produce documents on the
approved list and the preclusion of evidence sanction.
One of our committee persons, Bob Uhl of Los Angeles, has recommended the appointment of permanent discovery referees who would
do nothing other than hear and rule on discovery disputes, including
relevancy, burden, and privilege. The appointment of such a referee
would have the advantage of producing consistent rulings for those
requests not covered by the automatic approved list, and, after a
while, those rulings could be incorporated into amendments to the approved list.
In the end, we need to educate the parties about documents that
should be produced for particular cases. We need to educate the parties and the arbitrators on the effective use of pre-hearing confer-
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ences, and we need to be able to enforce the discovery rules so that
arbitration doesn't degenerate into the dilatory tactics of litigation.
I hope the claimants' bar and the defense bar can work together on
these serious, but solvable problems.
MR. STONE: First, I appreciate this opportunity to address this
Symposium. Unlike Caite, I do not have to give a disclaimer at this
point, although since my boss is here, I do have to watch what I say.
My good friend David Robbins has provided us with a very good
review of the history of discovery in the arbitration process at the
SROs, a solid analysis of Rule 619, 91 a critique of the problems associated with the rule, and suggested changes to those rules.
In reviewing David's presentation, one might conclude that there is
very little left for me to discuss. In fact, when I previewed his outline
last week, I felt at first that most of the areas concerning discovery
would be covered quite thoroughly. But in preparing for the Symposium, I realized that there are larger issues that need to be addressed-issues that are deeply imbedded in the theory behind and
the purpose of arbitration. To understand why the discovery process
is only a microcosm of the problems that we are now facing in arbitration, it is necessary to consider first the well-defined tension between
claimants' and respondents' bar.
Claimants, as you've already heard, argue that in order to prosecute
their cases, it is necessary for respondents to produce a vast array of
documents, that is, all possible documents, materials, and information
that could have any impact on the pending case. Respondents, as I am
sure you will hear from some of my colleagues after I finish my presentation, will argue-and I have argued on many occasions-that it is
quite difficult and costly to dredge up all of the documents requested
from the bowels of national and international brokerage firms. This
conflict is inherent in the litigation process and cannot, in my opinion,
be resolved by simply amending the Exchange's discovery rules.
Although this Symposium is a worthwhile forum to discuss these
issues, it will be difficult to resolve such issues because the real combatants-I think somebody said earlier "gladiators"-are the attorneys, and they are rarely willing to limit their objections or conform
discovery to the philosophy underlying the arbitration process.
I would like, therefore, to take a more global view of the discovery
process rather than to focus solely on Rule 619 and its inherent defects. Although given the opportunity, of course, I will not pass up
such opportunity to make some suggested modifications to Rule 619.
The correct place to start, I believe, in this discussion is to ask the
following question: What is the purpose of arbitration? My answer is
quite simple, and I think I agree with my good friend on the other side
of the table, Boyd Page, that it's really an attempt to avoid the court
91. NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 619, J 2619.
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system, its delays, complicated procedures, and the time-consuming,
extensive discovery process that even the litigators among us have
come to abhor.
I believe that the rules relating to arbitration, the framework under
which we are working, have become much more complicated. Discovery in arbitration is both extensive and time-consuming. Our primary
goal is to provide a mechanism that will allow for-and I almost quote
Boyd Page without knowing he was going to say it-a fair and speedy
resolution of a client's dispute with a brokerage firm, a solution that
seems even more difficult to obtain today.
Not only do I find routinely thirty page demands for production of
documents, each with many sub-paragraphs, but I also find that I must
produce the kitchen sink and even some of the fixtures. This is the
problem, and the time and effort that firms must go through to comply
with those demands is unbelievable. Some day I would like to have a
member of claimant's bar spend some time with us as we try to gather
documents in response to a detailed and complicated discovery request. It is relatively simple for the claimant to turn over a small
grouping of documents that are easily found; whereas, the time and
effort that respondents have to put into the discovery process is much
more burdensome.
We now find that we're getting requests for depositions and interrogatories that are making the entire arbitration process more complicated. The admonition in the rules to "cooperate to the fullest extent
practicable" 2 is honored more in the breach. Pre-hearing conferences are now routine, as are most matters related to discovery.
Doesn't this have the smell, the touch, the feel of litigation? It sure
does to me.
Now we must focus the entire process, especially discovery, on our
ultimate goal, which is to resolve quickly the client's claim. Has he or
she been wronged by the account executive or the firm? We must get
away from the extraneous issues that are complicating the process.
Those issues include: litigation for litigation's sake, posturing by attorneys for later arbitrations that claimants attorneys may be involved
in with the respondent firm, eliminating non-compensatory claims
such as punitive damages, and streamlining the discovery process.
I believe that the real concern of the client is seeking to recover his
or her monetary loss-not the extraneous issues introduced into the
proceedings, such as punitive damages, attorneys' fees, treble damages, and other issues that we have to deal with.
Let me provide one example-and I think David has alluded to itthat we face every day of the week in discovery. Do you allow discovery of other customer complaints relating to that account executive?
92. Uniform Code, supra note 14, § 20(a), at 16.
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David has well articulated those issues. I would like to discuss my
view of those issues.
Yes, you could argue, and I think it is argued, that there is some
relevance to those complaints. But from the other side of the ledger,
what are we introducing into this arbitration? Other client complaints
require almost a mini-trial on those issues. The arbitrations will become even more complicated. In my judgment-and I don't mean to
cast aspersions on any people on the other side of the table who prosecute client claims-it seems we find counsel really trolling for new
clients, new clients who will help him in other cases. We've actually
seen that happen.
Accordingly, I would like to make some additional suggestions. My
suggestions are not too different from those David suggested. They
are an attempt to simplify the process of discovery.
First,there should be a refinement of the list of discoverable documents that is included in The Arbitrator's Manual. But the focus
should be on which documents are appropriate for what type of cases.
I don't believe there is much argument that many of the documents
on that list need to be turned over. A requirement, however, to turn
over every confirmation issued for an account in every case-when
the cost and expense of gathering those documents are well understood-should be eliminated.
Second, it seems to me to be unfair to have a list of positive documents and not have a list of "negative documents." What is it that
shouldn't be turned over? What documents should not be required in
arbitration?
I would like further restrictions on depositions. We have found that
claimants' counsel harass us by seeking depositions of senior management, in many cases, our CEO and President. Do they need to testify
in these cases? Those individuals know nothing whatsoever about the
individual client's complaint.
Third, I am very concerned about the third-party discovery process
permitted in arbitration because this process is now being used for
improper purposes, such as seeking to obtain the names of other prospective clients. I think we need to have this issue further explored.
I agree fully with David that the continuation and enhancement of
the educational programs is a must. I think our arbitrators need to be
educated. I think it's important to all of us.
Finally, I am not against exploring the possibility of appointing special magistrates or people who have experience in dealing with discovery matters. I am not yet convinced that's the answer, but I'm willing
to explore it because I do agree that consistency does allow the parties-both claimants and respondents-to understand where the discovery process will lead in a particular case or proceeding.
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Because this Symposium is an attempt to vet these important issues
concerning arbitration, I would urge that we view each of them in a
larger context to determine whether we are really getting to our goal:
a simple, fair, speedy resolution of the clients' complaints.
Moreover, I urge each of the individuals present to provide input
because I don't believe that attorneys, like myself, have all the answers. Business people-some of you who are outside the litigation
process-can frequently give better answers because it is businessmen
and women who are sitting on the arbitration panels, ultimately
resolving these disputes.
PROF. KATSORIS: Thank you, Mike. We can open it up now for
comments.
Discussion
MR. BECKLEY: Perhaps, in deference to David's list of documents, I didn't notice anything on his mandatory list that would move
from the branch up to the region.
Many of the cases that the plaintiff's bar is involved in now involve
sales programs, whether they are programs on wrap accounts, partnerships, or the use of a particular strategy by several brokers in the
branch. Many times these types of program sales will end up with a
big stack of switch letters on a regional compliance manager's desk, or
a large number of exception runs. There are a lot of documents that
could have been included in this mandatory list that were not.
I think the industry's response really demonstrates a deep philosophical problem confronting all of us. The individual claimant is only
interested in his case and only interested in getting a fair result. The
industry must necessarily, and each house must necessarily, think of
this arbitration process in a global sense and look at it as yet another
expense item. So, while the industry may be thinking of arbitration as
a simple, quick, easy and, hopefully, fair approach, which will minimize expenses to the firm and the industry, the individual customer,
who is now required to go into arbitration, is going to do the best he
can to make this arbitration like litigation and get as much as he can
get to verify his claim.
The only way to get rid of this dichotomy and the only philosophical
way to eliminate this dichotomy is to make arbitration optional. If it
is optional, then we can simplify the discovery. Yes, we can make it
shorter. Yes, we can compress the number of documents you can get.
But if it's going to be mandatory, it's the only shot the claimant has.
It's the only place he can vindicate his claim, and if he must go to
arbitration, then arbitration, of course, must look like litigation.
MS. MASUCCI: One of the things that we really should focus on
when we talk about arbitration is the cost. One of the concerns that
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we have for the parties is that the process is becoming very expensive
for them.
We've seen a number of cases where the attorneys' fees end up being higher than the recovery that the parties receive in the arbitration
award. A substantial portion of that cost is associated with the
amount of time and expense associated with discovery. Anything that
can be done to streamline the discovery process will only help make
the process work better.
Not every case needs the amount of discovery that occurs. I think
there needs to be a lot of study about what really is relevant to each
case. The current system has a lot of tolerance for experimentation in
many areas. We shouldn't be building in a lot of rules that become
inflexible, create more of a monster than we really want, and also
raise the cost. I think that should be on everybody's mind.
MR. KREBSBACH: I never feel the answer is to make arbitration
more like the litigation process. I would like to get back to the picture
that Michael alluded to.
If you look at what's going on in the country right now, you realize
that the big picture is that the litigation system is failing; interest
groups on both sides make that argument. One of the main reasons
that litigation is failing is there is too much discovery.
So, I would be very reluctant to say that the way to conclude any
discovery problem in arbitration is to make it much more like litigation, which has already failed. I think there is a lot of merit to some of
the points that David raised. To the extent we can come up with solutions to narrow issues, to narrow discovery requests, and to get the
things resolved up front, I think we'll all be better served.
MR. CELLA: If there is one forum that a public customer can go
to, it's arbitration. To make out his case he has to go to where the
paper is, and he doesn't have the paper. He's got customer statements, but the paper trail on whether his claim is justifiable generally
lies with the respondent. So, there is no alternative for a public customer but to seek those documents or chain of documentation that
bear on the issues.
It is not to say that some claimants that are experienced ask for
documents that are unrelated and that becomes an issue to be resolved. But paper is devastating the world's forests, as we know. It
won't stop in arbitration. It can't. This is not the simple proposition
of purchasing a security over-the-counter under an elm tree from
some chap, and then it's his word against ours. This is very
sophisticated.
Because we have one system, the lawyers on both sides have transported into it, per force, a discovery procedural attitude that exists in
judicial litigation. I'm afraid unless the arbitrators, who are charged
with the responsibility to hear the disputes, act knowledgeably and
then follow with an order that must be obeyed, the problems that
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claimants' and respondents' counsel encounter will continue, if not get
worse.
MS. SHOCKMAN: If you do not allow a thoroughly great amount
of paper discovery, you really do deprive a claimant of the opportunity to prove his case in many situations. You narrow the case down
to the claimant coming in and telling his story of what he remembers,
and the broker coming in and telling her story. So often, however, the
broker, who is in the sales business, and who is in the business in
which the panel is likely to be, is going to be a witness who is much
better able to articulate his side of the story.
If you're going to give a claimant a fair opportunity to present his
case, he has to be able to get the paper background of what happened,
and often he needs to find other customers who had the identical
thing happen to them, so he can have them come in and say the broker told them the same thing, and so on.
In the court system it's well established that you can bring those
types of witnesses in. Unless you're permitted to discover them and
bring them into the arbitration proceedings, you're cutting the claimant's case down to being able to say what he remembers, his word
against the broker's word, and you really are depriving him of the fair
opportunity to bring his case.
I would also like to say, on some of the discovery-type issues, the
firms raise the issue of the efficiency of arbitration when it suits them,
and they let that issue go to the wayside when it does not.
Clearly, the firms have had repeated cases brought against them.
For example, in the limited partnership situation, where they could
have created databases of documents and made the production much
less expensive, and that has been done in other industries, they didn't
try to do that. They did not try to cut their costs. They just raised the
issue as one that should prevent the claimants from getting documents. So, sometimes the issue of efficiency and expediency is raised
when that really isn't the issue involved.
MR. PELOSO: I have several comments. The trouble I have with
David's suggestion that a discrete list of documents should always be
produced is that it doesn't recognize that each case has got to be different, so I don't think that's a good idea, although I can see why it
was suggested. In the final analysis, the question of what should be
produced in any given case is going to be a matter of arbitrator
discretion.
The second problem I have is whether the arbitrators correctly evaluate what standard should be applied to award production. I think
there is a tendency on the part of arbitrators to err on the side of, say,
give it to them, and that happens all of the time. In doing that, the
arbitrators don't always recognize things like privilege. Often, the arbitrators are not lawyers. They are not always sensitive to privilege
issues and to the dilemma that a lawyer faces when he's directly sub-
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ject to sanctions to produce, even for inspection, a document that he
claims is subject to the attorney-client privilege. He is faced with the
potential dilemma of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
on the one hand, or having his client sanctioned on the other.
In my mind, the real question is not whether there should be discovery-certainly there should be discovery, document discovery-but
the question is really what standards are the arbitrators using to order
discovery? Do they have a tendency just to order discovery and err
on that side?
And thirdly, are they giving proper consideration to the law that
would preclude one party from giving discovery?
MR. LIPNER: I echo some of what Ted says. We shouldn't just try
to make arbitration more like litigation. But arbitration and litigation
share something, and that's that they are both involved in dispute resolution and hopefully an attempt to discover the truth. One of the
things that arbitration shares with litigation is that the plaintiff or
claimant has the burden of proof. And it seems to me that if there are
documents that exist that would aid the plaintiff in his case, they
should be produced, and the same exists for the defense.
While we can talk about how there are abuses on both sides, and I
think this is one case where abuses do abound on both sides, I tend to
find that discovery issues become a game that really pollutes the arbitration scene because there is no effective mechanism for resolving the
discovery disputes, getting the case on for trial, and putting in the
hands of both parties the ability to go ahead and try their case and get
to the truth.
It seems to me that the problem isn't the fact of discovery. While
the fact of discovery-the existence of document exchanges-and the
burden on people to have to come forward with documents is burdensome on both sides, it may not be as costly for that eighty-year-old
lady to find her 1985 tax returns as it is for Dean Witter to find confirmation slips or order tickets from 1985. It doesn't change the fact that
it is equally burdensome for her to do so. As the plaintiff, she should
take on that burden because if it's relevant, she should go ahead and
produce the document. The same is true for the defense.
The question that comes before us isn't whether discovery is a good
idea. The question is how can we manage it better within the scope of
what we're trying to do: to provide an efficient method of dispute
resolution. When we look at the courts, we see that they have been
grappling with these problems for many years, and they have made
some changes in the last few years.
Now, even I know when I go to federal court, I'm not going to be
able to take twenty depositions in forty days. The magistrate will limit
me. Even I know that there is going to be an objection to serving one
hundred interrogatories. He will limit me.
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The notion is that we could sit down with the arbitrator, or sit down
amongst the parties, and set up some limits at the beginning before
discovery dates get placed. We're going to ask for twenty sets of documents. We're going to ask for five interrogatories. We're going to
have depositions. There should be one on each side.
If we can set up that kind of discovery plan before we get into the
contests about which document is or is not relevant, we can move forward in getting this resolved faster. I think we can learn from the
litigation system, and maybe a magistrate system is another thing we
can look at because it is working in the litigation system to make the
process of discovery less odious.
MR. STONE: Just a couple of comments. I think my presentation
suggested and agrees that there is a need for discovery, and so we
have not suggested a cut off of all document production.
I think the comparison of a claimant who must find four tax returns
over a period of time and a brokerage firm searching for documents,
hundreds or thousands of documents-there can be no comparison
there. So, yes, it may be "difficult" for the claimant to recapture her
two tax returns in question, but I'll measure up what clients have to
produce against what the brokerage firm has to produce-there can
be no comparison.
Then, I take objection to one premise you stated, Seth. Maybe legally a claimant has the burden of proof, but I think when you come
into an arbitration with a client who has lost money, I think the burden is balanced. I think the brokerage firm has an equal obligation to
prove that they didn't do anything wrong, and that has now permeated the arbitration process.
I think the purpose and the concept here is for both sides to get out
what they need to, at least that is what this Symposium is intending to
do, and I think what the outcome will be is really to try to have a
meeting of competing interests.
I disagree with Jim, and I disagree with Peter. Arbitration was not
supposed to recreate litigation. It never was, and it never will be. It's
a method of resolving a client's dispute fairly, speedily, and in a cost
effective manner for all involved. When we get away from that concept, we miss the bottom line.
PROF. KATSORIS: Having heard from the gladiators on both
sides, I would like to interject with a different perspective, the point of
view of the arbitrator. Most of my experience in this area has been as
a public member of SICA and as a public arbitrator, where I've been
involved in about two hundred cases.
Arbitrators ultimately are the ones that decide the issues of discovery, the evidence, and finally come to a conclusion on the case. I see
the romance of some rigid rules, but frankly you could have all the
rules you want. If I am sitting as an arbitrator, I'm going to make my
own decision. So, the rules, even if they are allegedly cast in stone,
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are there solely to facilitate. So, you have to be very, very careful in
making them too rigid before you begin infringing on the arbitrator's
role.
A tax return on an unauthorized trade, or something like that, may
not be important. It may not have anything to do with it. So, it's
going to be very difficult, I think, to set these rules in stone.
On the issue of sanctions, David, you mentioned you've never seen
preclusion, but you hit it right on point. In one experience I had in a
very, very difficult case, we (all three arbitrators) had a discovery
hearing early on. The music began, the waltz started very slowly, but
we had an all-day hearing, and we specifically ruled on about two
dozen discovery issues.
The trial date was set for about five months thereafter, and the arbitrators blocked out a continuous two week period for the actual trial
because of the unique circumstances of the case. It was also emphasized at that time that it was important, for a variety of reasons, that
the trial begin on time.
Months after the discovery rulings, and only one week before the
first hearing date, we received complaints, for the first time, that all
documents had not been exchanged, and an adjournment was requested by one of the parties.
In view of the history of that case, we ruled that the arbitration
hearing would proceed the following week, as scheduled, and unless
all documents required in the previous discovery ruling were produced immediately, the panel would entertain a motion for the preclusion of such related evidence at the first hearing date.
By the end of that week, a few days before the first hearing date, we
were notified that the case had been settled.
Unfortunately, many arbitrators don't realize the important and significant role they play over the fair resolution of the case. I think
that's an area that Peter Cella will discuss at the December 5th session
on arbitrator training. 3 We must educate our arbitrators as to what
they can do and what they can't do. They must be told that they have
awesome power that, of course, has to be exercised justly. Some arbitrators only know about the written complaint and answer before
them, and they are merely given superficial instruction in the basics of
arbitration, but that is not enough.
To emphasize the imperative role in long and complex cases of a
forceful, fair, innovative, and knowledgeable trier of the fact-be it an
arbitrator or a judge-I would like to draw an analogy to a testimonial given to Judge Milton Pollack on his recently being awarded the
Stein Award on Ethics,9 4 wherein it was noted how he saved the
Southern District of New York years of litigation by establishing
93. See infra pp. 1682-85.
94. Describing Judge Polack's efforts, Dean John D. Feerick said:
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ground rules for the global resolution of lawsuits against Michael
Milken and Drexel.
I would also like to emphasize the importance of consensual agreement. As an arbitrator, I like nothing better than to have two attorneys who know what they are doing come to me with what they can
agree to and what they cannot agree to. Where the attorneys cannot
agree, of necessity, you leave it to the arbitrators for resolution. If
you needlessly fight about everything, justice is not served in the long
run.

MR. EPPENSTEIN: Well, Professor, let's remember a few things.
Number one, arbitration is war. Cases settle. If they don't settle, they
get tried. If you have to try the case for the claimant, you do the best
you can.
Often times arbitration means economic survival for their customers and our clients. The respondents, we know, are going to argue
that the claimant has the burden of proof, and if we don't have the
documents, which are in the hands of the broker-dealers, to help
prove our case, the claimant shouldn't be entitled to recover.
While I'll agree that the issues usually turn on credibility of witnesses in securities arbitrations, the arbitrators, as you know, look for
the documentary evidence that will support what each witness is saying or that would be used in cross-examination against those
witnesses.
In these times of crushing caseloads and spiraling litigation costs, which
often combine to delay or, indeed, deny justice, Judge Pollack is widely recognized and universally acclaimed as a model of innovative, practical, and
expeditious adjudication.
Judge Pollack's extraordinary qualities and abilities are perhaps best ilustrated by the global resolution he engineered of lawsuits against Michael
Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert, the crowning achievement of a long
and distinguished career. In the wake of the law enforcement initiatives that
led to their demise, Milken, Drexel, and others were besieged by scores of
private lawsuits brought on behalf of hundreds of thousands of investors
seeking billions of dollars in damages. These disparate cases from a multitude of different jurisdictions were consolidated before Judge Pollack.
Thanks to his mastery of the subject matter, his tenacity, his forcefulness,
and his fairness, all of them were received by way of settlement. I understand that there was a sense of incredulity among those involved that such an
enormous volume of litigation involving so many different parties and so
much money could be disposed of so efficiently by mutual agreement.
The value of Judge Polack's successful efforts to resolve the Drexel and
Milken litigation is incalculable. At the most basic level, the settlement
means quick and certain compensation to claimants. Beyond that, the settlement will relieve the courts of what would have surely been years of extraordinary complex and costly litigation. Finally, for all those who decry
the dismal state of our legal system, the settlement serves as an inspiring
illustration of what can be accomplished when innovative procedural rules
are applied in a creative, intelligent, and even-handed way.
John D. Feerick, Remarks, Judge Pollack Awarded Stein Prize,The Advocate, Nov. 8,
1994, at 1, 3.
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So, what we're talking about here is discovery, not necessarily to be
compared with and joined with evidence. We're talking about discovery. I'm in favor of broad discovery for both sides. Unfortunately, I
see multiple discovery abuses that I would like to see an end to.
First of all, the complaint that records just can't be found, I find
often happens with the most meaningful ones. Often I find important
production at the hearings, when witnesses will slip and say, "There is
a document on the file in the computer," and it hasn't yet been produced. Unfortunately, we also get documents produced that are altered, or that are redacted. We find documents are produced in
illegible fashion. We find document requests are used to intimidate
and harass claimants.
I would like the industry to join in with some of the suggestions
made, which I think are fair and reasonable for everyone. Because
we're in the system of dispute resolution, let's try to work to get some
meaningful rules out of it and put some punch to the rules that do
evolve.
PROF. KATSORIS: Ted, I was well aware that you were talking
about discovery and maybe the arbitrators, as Dave points out, should
be brought in right at the beginning. They are going to try the case, so
they should rule on the discovery. They should rule on many of these
issues right up front.
MR. EPPENSTEIN: Good suggestion. And we usually ask for a
panel to be empaneled well before we think the hearings will be held
for that purpose.
PROF. KATSORIS: Do you have any comment on that, Mike?
MR. STONE: I have no objection to a panel being appointed earlier. One of the problems we run into now is that a person is appointed, and that person is ruling on discovery requests before either
side has an opportunity to determine whether they would object to
that arbitrator.
Except for that issue, I have no problem with the selection of arbitrators at anytime in the proceeding. But we should not put the cart
before the horse, having somebody making determinations who may
be objectionable, either on a peremptory challenge or on a challenge
for cause.
MS. MASUCCI: That's why I indicated earlier that I believe the
rules are flexible enough to respond to a lot of these concerns without
additional rule making.
At the request of a group of plaintiff and defense attorneys, the
NASD has been experimenting with an alternative process for arbitrator and hearing date selection as a pilot program in specific cities. The
normal process used today is to select a hearing date and then the
arbitrators. The experiment is intended to facilitate the resolution of
discovery problems early in the process. Under the pilot, arbitrators
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are selected right after the issue is joined, that is, when the answer is
received. After the parties have accepted the panel, we then select a
hearing date, as well as a backup prehearing conference date, that
could be used to resolve discovery if it's necessary.
We're testing this through the end of the year, at which point we're
going to be evaluating whether this method is more effective in resolving discovery disputes and responding to the complaints that parties
have, versus the process we use now.
On the issue of selecting arbitrators, in over eighty-nine percent of
the cases, arbitration panels are selected more than ninety days prior
to the hearing, so from the SRO point of view, we're trying to respond
to the demands of the parties to appoint panels earlier and faster.
That doesn't always answer all of the problems.
Again, it's the flexibility inherent right now in the processing that's
making that work.
PROF. KATSORIS: No further comments? Any questions of the
panelists? I'm glad we "resolved" the issue of discovery.

